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Abstract
Real estate platforms provide a new source of data which has already been used as
a substitute for transaction data in hedonic regression applications. This paper asks
whether it is valid to do so in the established research areas of (1) willingness to pay
estimation, (2) automated valuations, and (3) price index construction. It therefore
compares listings and transaction data and regression results derived from them. We
find that ask prices stochastically dominate sale prices,mainly because the composition
of characteristics differs between the two data sets. But estimates of implicit prices
also differ. As a result, willingness to pay estimates from listings data can be widely
off when compared with estimates from transaction data. Listings data are not very
useful to predict market values of individual houses either, as these predictions suffer
from upward bias and large error variance. We find, however, that an ask price index
complements a sale price index, as it is useful for nowcasting.
Keywords Hedonic modelling · Nowcasting · Price prediction · Stochastic
dominance
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1 Introduction
The internet is a newsource of data for economic research. Suchdatamake it possible to
answer research questions that could not be answered before and maymake it easier to
answer established questions (Edelman 2012). In the area of housing market research,
listings from real estate platforms are such a source of new data, which is—contrary to
transaction data—readily available. Platforms, such as Immoscout24 (IS24), connect
thosewhoplan to sell (customers)with thosewho intend to buy (users).1 This generates
an abundance of data, as houses can be listed multiple times until transacted or taken
off. Platforms use their own data to attract attention from potential customers and
users. IS24, for instance, offers an automated valuation service and publishes the IMX
price index. Customers and users might not be aware that these products are based on
listings data.2
Economists have started to use the timely listings data as a substitute for trans-
action data in such established areas of housing market research as hedonic pricing,
automated valuation, and index construction. In hedonic pricing applications, the will-
ingness to pay (WTP) for non-traded amenities is estimated with regressions of price
on characteristics. The estimates can then be used to assess public policies, such as
a ban on night flights (Taylor 2017). Bauer et al. (2017), Kholodilin et al. (2017),
and Winke (2017) use listings data to estimate WTP for nuclear power plant closures,
energy efficiency of buildings, and aircraft noise reduction, respectively. In automated
valuation applications,market values of properties are predicted based on fitted regres-
sion models. Financial institutions use these valuations, for instance in the process of
mortgage securitisation. While the regressions are usually fit with transaction data,
Antipov and Pokryshevskaya (2012) and Pérez-Rave et al. (2019) use listings data
instead. In index construction applications, price trends of average properties should
be measured over time. As properties are heterogeneous, regressions are used to con-
trol for property heterogeneity. Central banks need price indices to guide policy and
financial institutions need them for loan portfolio risk management. Arguably, ask
price indices can be useful in this context. Bauer et al. (2013), in work that informed
the IMX of IS24, go further and argue that price trends can be measured better and at
higher frequency with abundant listings than with sparse transaction data.
In this paper, we examine whether it is valid to use listings as substitute for trans-
action data in the three applications of housing market research. We approach this
question in three steps. In the first step, presented below, we review the literature on
the role of listings in the selling process and ask whether one should expect listings
to be a valid substitute for transactions, the outcome of this process. The second step
and third step use listings and transaction data of single-family houses from Berlin,
1 IS24 is the largest platform in Germany, followed by Immowelt. Both are also active in Austria and
Switzerland. Platforms in other countries are Zillow (USA) and Rightmove (UK).
2 It is not easy to detect this. For instance, press releases of IS24 (23.04.2020) and Immowelt (Nürnberg
23.06.2020) use the terms sale price (Kaufpreis) and ask price (Angebotspreis) interchangeably.
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Germany, to examine empirically the question in detail by comparing the data sets and
the regressions results derived from them.
The literature on the house selling process raises doubts that listings data are a valid
substitute for information on actual transactions. According to the literature, a rational
seller will use the ask price to attract interest and signal which bid will be accepted
with certainty, but bids below the ask price will also be accepted if higher than a
seller’s private reservation value. The ask price is therefore an upper bound for the
sale price if the listing is successful. Horowitz (1992) derives such seller behaviour in
a simple framework, and Yavaş and Yang (1995) extend the framework by introducing
brokers working on behalf of sellers. The extension by Chen and Rosenthal (1996) is
more substantial, as they introduce uncertainty for potential buyers who must learn
first whether a house is suitable. Inspecting a house is costly, even more so as an
opportunistic seller will try to appropriate buyer’s surplus if the house is suitable. A
public ask price limits the inspection cost for potential buyers as it commits the seller.
Chen andRosenthal (1996) also examine bargaining and find that the seller can counter
bargaining power of the buyer up to a point. Only a weak seller will not bargain and
sell at the ask price, see also Arnold (1999). We see that successful listings have an
ask price higher than the sale price. All else equal, unsuccessful listings will have an
even higher ask price. This conjecture is supported by empirical evidence from the
literature.3
If the markup does not vary across properties, it will not bias the relationship
between prices and characteristics. It would be absorbed simply by the constant term in
regression applications. However, as the selling process involves bargaining between
heterogeneous and differently informed sellers and buyers, a fixed mark-up seems
implausible, seeMerlo and Ortalo-Magné (2004). Obviously, if a seller who is good at
hagglingmeets a buyer who is not, we expect a higher transaction price than otherwise,
all else equal. Genesove and Mayer (1997) present evidence that sellers who have
mortgage loans with high LTVs hold out for longer and sell at higher prices (if they
can sell). Harding et al. (2003) find evidence that seller and buyer characteristics
impact on the sale price. Harding et al. (2003) find some evidence that seller and
buyer characteristics should be included in regression applications to prevent biased
estimates of hedonic prices. As seller and buyer have been matched in a transaction,
their characteristics, if observed, can be used to control for effects of bargaining. Such
control can never be implemented with listings data, as it is not known whether a
house will be sold, to whom, and at which price.4 Successful bargaining should also
result in an improved description of the house. In a listing, a seller might not report
characteristics that make a house unattractive or misreport characteristics in error. A
diligent buyer will ensure that all information on the property is recorded correctly
3 In the data of Shimizu et al. (2016), the average ask price is about 25% (36%) higher than the average
registered sale price for successful (unsuccessful) listings. In the matched data of Haurin et al. (2010) and
Carrillo (2012), the average ask price is 4% and 2% higher than the average sale price, respectively. This
relationship between ask and sale price will hold for the majority of transactions, but the share might vary
with the market. Han and Strange (2014, Table 2), for instance, find a share of 91% during the US market
bust (2007–2010) compared to 86% during the boom (2003–2006).
4 Admittedly, seller and buyer characteristics are rarely reported in transaction data sets. But this does not
invalidate the argument. Our transaction data contains some information on sellers and buyers.
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and this will show up in the transaction data. The literature reviewed so far shows that
ask prices and characteristics may have a different relationship than sale prices and
characteristics, because listings data may lack relevant house characteristics and has
not gone through the process of successful bargaining.
A recent strand of the literature uses insight from behavioural economics to under-
stand how ask prices are set. Genesove and Mayer (2001) assume that sellers are
prone to loss aversion. They find that sellers who experienced nominal losses since
the purchase of the property they want to sell, set high ask prices and are willing
to wait for a long time for a good offer. If such an offer does not arrive, the house
will eventually be taken off the market. This is relevant here for two reasons. First,
listings data may contain many observations with comparatively high ask prices and
low transaction probabilities. Second, ask prices might be backward looking. This
should not only have an impact on the relative pricing of characteristics, but Genesove
and Mayer find also evidence that ask prices take several quarters to adjust to market
prices. This questions whether price indices based on ask prices can serve as nowcasts
for transaction price indices that are only observed with delay.
The literature review indicates that listings data and transaction data are different
and that it is unlikely that the former can substitute for the latter. In the rest of the
paper, we analyse the distributions of our listings and transaction data and, as we find
that the distributions differ, examine possible reasons for the selectivity of the listings
data. We use then the listings and transaction data for the regression applications of
hedonic pricing, automated valuation, and index construction and examine what the
selectivity implies in economic terms.
Our main empirical findings are as follows. First, ask and sale prices are distributed
differently, mainly because the composition of characteristics differs. This comple-
ments the finding of Shimizu et al. (2016) for condominium data from Tokyo. We go
further and establish that characteristics in the listings data are stochastically larger
than their counterparts in the transaction data. We explore also possible explanations
of why the characteristics distributions differ as they do. We find some evidence that
platforms attract more sophisticated customers and users. Second, we obtain the new
finding that estimates of implicit prices differ statistically between the two data sets
and that this difference enforces the distributional dominance relationship. Third,
we obtain that regression applications fitted to listings data can give implicit price
functions that are counterintuitive. To impose as little structure as possible in these
applications, we use semiparametric additive models. Estimates of average WTP can
also be widely off when compared with the estimates from transaction data. Listings
data are not very useful to predict market values of individual houses either, as these
predictions suffer from upward bias and large error variance. We also find that an ask
price index is not a substitute for a sale price index but a complement, as we obtain
statistical evidence that it is useful for nowcasting.
Our results are in line with the literature on self-assessed property market values.
While self-assessed market values are not the same as ask prices, both are before any
contact with potential buyers. The common evidence shows that owners overestimate
market value, see Goodman and Ittner (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1999). Banzhaf and
Farooque (2013) find that self-assessed values are less useful in hedonic analysis than
transaction prices. The recent paper by Bigelow et al. (2020) contains an excellent
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summary of this literature. Their study compares hedonic prices estimated from self-
assessed values and market transactions and finds that owners misjudge the value of
land characteristics that are salient to them. Consequently, hedonic prices for such
characteristics estimated with self-assessed values differ from those estimated with
transaction prices.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes and analyses
the transaction and listings data. Section 3 explains the implementation of the three
regression applications and presents results. Section 4 concludes. The web-appendix
provides further details.
2 Transaction and listings data-description and analysis
2.1 Data sources
The data cover the period 2007–2015. The transaction data are provided by Berlin’s
surveyor commission (GAA, Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte in Berlin). By
law, surveyor commissions are obliged to keep a detailed record of each and every real
estate transaction that takes place in Berlin. To facilitate this, commissions have access
to sale contracts, administrative data, and can request further clarification from parties
involved in a transaction. Each observation has information on the sale price, physical
and legal characteristics of the building and the plot, such as rights of way, andwhether
the buyer or seller is a public or private legal entity, such as a housing association or a
real estate fund. We have also information on the legal specifics of transactions, such
as personal or business relationships between the contracting parties, such as divorce
and inheritance or a sale that stipulates deferred payment. As such transactions are not
arm’s-length, we do not use them. This leaves us with 17,650 observations of market
transactions in the GAA data.
The listings data are provided by IS24, the largest real estate platform in Ger-
many.5 IS24 brings not only customers (potential sellers) and users (potential buyers)
in contact, but allows also third parties, such as agents, mortgage banks, and apprais-
ers, to advertise their services. IS24 listings are similar to classified ads, but modern
technology gives much more flexibility. For instance, the customer can modify the
content of an ad during a listing’s term; it is also possible to extend the term, while the
listing is still active.6 Users searching for properties can register with IS24 and will
receive afterwards personalised newsletters with updates on visited listings and links
to similar properties on offer. As marketing platform, IS24 takes no responsibility that
the information on listed properties is complete, correct, and that the properties are
still available, i.e. have not been sold in the meantime (IS24 Terms and Conditions,
Immobilien Scout 24 (2018, 5.1, 6.1, 9.1)).
5 Bundeskartellamt, Fallbericht B6-39/15 (25.06.2015). In 2017, IS24 listed 470,000 properties and had
about 13m visitors per month, 1.9 and 1.6 times as many as the next largest competitor (Scout24 2017).
6 Possible terms are: two weeks, one month, three months. Listings can also be premium or basic. Premium
listings permit a detailed presentation of the property and the ad will be placed more prominently on the
web page.
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Table 1 Effects of data cleaning. Gives the number of observations in the original data and after each step
of the data cleaning procedure. Missing values refer to observations that lack entries for some of the core
variables. Old refers to a house that has a building which is older than 100 years at the date of transaction or
the last listing day. Bounds for plot area, floor area, and transaction price per floor area come from annual
reports of the GAA
GAA IS24
Original data 17,650 144,274
After removing
Missing values 17,650 106,193
Old or under construction 15,242 83,952
Outwith bounds 12,524 68,070
For each IS24 listing, we keep only the information from the last day for which
it is observed. If the listing was successful and a buyer could be found, then this is
the date closest to the transaction. Obviously, a listing could also have ended without
having attracted a buyer. The property might be listed later again under a different
identification code, perhaps with slightly varied information on the property. It is
also possible that the very same property is marketed by different agents separately.
Furthermore, developers use platforms to advertise different specifications of new
projects before going ahead to learn which ones find most interest. These aspects
motivate why the IS24 data have 144,274 observations, about 8.2 times as many as
the GAA data.
2.2 Data cleaning
The IS24 data suffer from many patchy observations, the result of relying solely upon
customer provided information. We concentrate on observations with sale (GAA) and
ask (IS24) price that have complete entries for the following core characteristics: plot
area, floor area, building age, house type, and administrative district in which the house
is located.7 In some parts of our examination, we use coordinates to model location
values.
Despite the fairly small set of core characteristics, Table 1 shows that 26% of
observations in the IS24 data must be removed. No observation in the GAA data must
be removed, a sign of data quality.
The remaining rows in Table 1 show the effects of deleting unusual observations.
First, we remove observations of development projects and houses that are either still
under construction or older than 100 years. Both are different from standard houses
in the sense that the former do not exist yet and that the latter have existed for longer
than usual. This reduces the number of observations by 14% (GAA) and 21% (IS24).
Second, we apply bounds to the plot area, the floor area, and the price to floor area
7 The GAA data reports for most observations exclusively the exterior floor area; the IS24 data reports
exclusively the interior area. The GAA suggests a factor of 1.25 to convert interior area to floor area
(Gutachterausschuss für Grundstückswerte 2011, p. 44). We apply this factor to the IS24 observations, but
examine an alternative in the robustness checks.
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ratio. A researcher equipped only with listings data would use such publicly available
information for data preparation.8 We treat the GAA data equally and apply the same
bounds to it. This reduces the numbers of observations by 18% (GAA) and 19% (IS24).
The final data sets have 12,524 (GAA) and 68,070 (IS24) observations; we refer to
the former as sale (index s) and the latter as ask data (index a).
2.3 Comparative analysis of the two data sets
We start the analysis with a close examination of the two data sets. Table 2 presents
descriptive statistics of prices and characteristics. On average, houses in the ask data
have higher prices, are younger and have larger floor and plot areas than houses in the
sale data. Given the literature, higher ask prices are to be expected and Shimizu et al.
(2016) also observe differences in characteristics.
The markup of ask to sale price is 28% for the arithmetic averages (Pa/Ps − 1)
and 26% for the geometric averages (exp{pa − ps} − 1). The markups are sizeable
and similar to those reported in Shimizu et al. (2016). Figure 1 gives further evidence
on the price distributions, where we concentrate on log prices, as it is common in the
literature. The left panel shows the markups for the percentiles of the price distribu-
tions.9 The markups are particularly high in the tails. All markups are strictly positive
and statistically significant. Given the density estimates in the right panel, it seems that
ask prices dominate sale prices stochastically, which would imply Fa(p)− Fs(p) ≤ 0
for all p ∈ [0,max(pa, ps)].10 The dominance is strong if the inequality is strict for
some p.









̂Fj (p) − ̂Fk(p)
}
(1)
and the procedure of Barrett and Donald (2003, p. 75). Hats denote estimators and Ni
the number of observations. The null hypothesis is Fj (p) − Fk(p) ≤ 0 over the full
support and the test statistic focuses on the most unfavourable outcome for the null. If
the null is true, we expect̂d j,k ≤ 0. If the alternative Fj (p) > Fk(p) is true for at least
one p, we expect ̂d j,k > 0. The procedure works as follows. First, we test whether
̂da,s ≤ 0. If we cannot reject, we continue and test whether we can reject ̂ds,a ≤ 0. If
we can reject, we have established strong dominance. Table 3 presents the statistics
for the price distribution in Panel A. We conclude that ask prices dominate sale prices
strictly at all of the usual significance levels (0.001, 0.01, 0.05). This implies also that
E[pa] > E[ps], whereas the reverse does not necessarily apply. It has been observed
8 The bounds are differentiated further by location, house type, and vintage of the building. We collate the
bounds from annual reports published by the GAA, see the web-appendix (A).
9 The mark-up at quantile τ is exp{pa(τ ) − ps (τ )} − 1 .= pa(τ ) − ps (τ ); we estimate the right-hand side
with quantile regressions of prices on a constant and an indicator that is one (zero) for the ask (sale) price.
10 Stochastic dominance means Proba{pa ≥ p} ≥ Probs {ps ≥ p}. This is equivalent to 1 − Fa(p) ≥
1 − Fs (p), which gives the inequality in the text.
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Table 2 Summary statistics for sale and ask data sets. Panel A gives also information for variables other than
the core variables. Prices are in 000’ Euros. Age of building at the date of sale or end of listing, respectively.
Floor and plot area are in sqm. Legal entity indicates that buyer (seller) is an housing associations, real
estate fund, or other legal entity
Mean SD Min Max
Panel A. Sale data (N = 12, 524)
Price (Ps ) 250.50 129.07 40.00 1450.00
ln Price (ps ) 12.33 0.45 10.60 14.19
Age 44.94 30.37 0.00 100.00
Floor area 144.78 52.79 41.00 642.00
























Panel B. Ask data (N = 68, 070)
Price (Pa ) 320.96 189.96 45.00 2020.00
ln Price (pa ) 12.56 0.46 10.71 14.52
Age 32.02 27.92 0.00 100.00
123
Real estate listings and their usefulness...
Table 2 continued
Mean SD Min Max
Floor area 187.21 74.93 50.00 650.00


































Fig. 1 Distributions of ask and sale prices. Left panel shows markups of ask over sales prices at different
quantiles. Horizontal lines give markups at the medians (20.1%) and means (23.4%). Whiskers give point-
wise confidence intervals at the 0.95 level. Right panel shows kernel density estimates of the distributions
of prices from ask data set (solid black) and from sale data set (dashed gray). Bandwidths are chosen with
Silverman’s (1986) rule-of-thumb. Vertical lines are the respective means of the ask and sale prices
before in the literature that pa > ps , but our evidence on the price distributions is
much stronger.
The strong dominance of the ask price distribution could be caused either because
the house characteristics differ between the data sets or because the characteristics
are valued differently or because both effects play a role. We explore these issues
by comparing the distribution of characteristics in the two data sets, followed by a
decomposition analysis. The estimates in Fig. 2 indicate that houses in the ask data
not only have different averages of age, floor area and plot area, but that characteristics
in the ask data dominate those in the sale data. This is confirmed by the results of strong
dominance tests reported in Panel A of Table 3.11
11 The age variable is discrete and the KS results could be too conservative. We conduct also Wilcoxon–
Mann–Whitney tests, which lead to the same individual and joint test outcomes as those from Table 3.
123
J. Kolbe et al.
Table 3 Stochastic dominance tests. The statistic ̂d j ,k ( j = k) tests the null hypothesis that distribution j
dominates distribution k weakly. In Panel A, the variable tested for is−AGE , ̂d j,k is the signed two sample
KS test statistic, defined in Eq. (1). The p values for the null are calculated as exp{−2(̂d j,k )2}, see Barrett
and Donald (2003, p. 78). In Panel B, ̂d j ,k is the KS maximal t-statistic as defined in Chernozhukov et al.
(2013, p. 2222). The p-values for the null are calculated as R−1 ∑r 1(̂d∗j,k,r > ̂d j,k ), where ̂d∗j,k,r is the
r ′th bootstrap test statistic, see Barrett and Donald (2003, p. 8). The number of bootstrap replications is
200
̂da,s p value ̂ds,a p-value
Panel A. Marginal distributions
Price 0.000 1.000 20.577 0.000
Age 0.286 0.849 24.689 0.000
Floor area 0.000 1.000 34.102 0.000
Plot area 0.027 0.999 9.007 0.000
Panel B. Price decomposition
Price 0.000 0.915 48.777 0.000
Characteristics 0.000 0.860 53.132 0.000

































































Fig. 2 Distributions of house characteristics. Top panel shows histograms of building age for the observa-
tions in the ask and the sale data, respectively. Lower panel shows kernel density estimates of floor area
(left) and plot area (right) for the observations in the data. Bandwidths are chosen with Silverman’s (1986)
rule-of-thumb
123



































 of transactions [%]
Sale data
Fig. 3 Spatial distribution of ask and sale observations. Shows the relative frequency of observations in the
ask and sales data across Berlin’s 12 administrative districts. Crosses give locations of the 59,502 (12,218)
individual observations in the ask (sale) data for which we have coordinates
Table 2 shows that the proportion of detached houses is higher in the ask than in the
sale data and the proportion of terraced houses is lower.12 This could explain why the
floor and plot area distributions of the ask data dominate those of the sale data. Figure 3
shows that the observations of the two data sets follow a similar spatial cluster and
are, at the level of Berlin’s administrative districts, nearly identical with a correlation
of ρ = 0.97. The observed characteristics can therefore not explain why the houses
in the ask data are dominantly younger.
In summary, the analysis of the core characteristics age, floor and plot area shows
strong dominance of observations in the ask over their counterparts in the sale data.
We explore next whether this is the sole reason for the strong dominance of ask over
sale prices.
2.4 Decomposition analysis
Weuse the inference procedure of Chernozhukov et al. (2013) to assess the importance
of house characteristics for the differential of ask and sale price distributions. The
procedure is similar in spirit to the decomposition at the means of Blinder (1973) and
Oaxaca (1973). The starting point is the following formula which—akin the law of




FPj |X j (p|x)dFXk (x) (2)
FPi |Xi (p|x) is the price distribution conditional on the vector x of characteristics and
FXi (x) is the distribution of these characteristics. If k = j , both the conditional price
12 t-tests (not reported) show that the proportions of the three house types are different between the data at
the usual significance levels.
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distribution and the distribution of characteristics come from the same data set and
Eq. (2) reduces to the unconditional price distribution function Fj | j (p) = Fj (p). For
k = j , however, Eq. (2) considers counterfactual situations. For instance, combining
the conditional price distribution FPa |Xa (p|x) of the ask data with the distribution of
characteristics FXs (x) of the sale data, leads to the counterfactual distribution Fa|s(p).
This is the distribution of ask prices thatwould prevail if the actual relationship between
ask prices and characteristics were combined with the distribution of characteristics
found in the sale data. The counterfactual distribution allows to decompose of the
difference between the ask and sale price distributions
Fa(p) − Fs(p) = {Fa|a(p) − Fa|s(p)} + {Fa|s(p) − Fs|s(p)} (3)
The first term on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) reflects differences due to the com-
position of characteristics in the data and the second term reflects differences due
to different relationships between prices and characteristics in both groups. From the
viewpoint of hedonic regression, the second component quantifies the component of
Fa(p) − Fs(p) due to differences in implicit pricing of these characteristics among
listed and transacted houses.
To test whether each of the two terms on the right-hand side of Eq. (3) obeys a
stochastic dominance relationship, we proceed as follows.13 First, we estimate the
distribution functions with










x′k,n̂β j (τg) ≤ p
)
(4)
The argument of the indicator function 1(·) is the characteristics bundle of observa-
tion n from data set k evaluated at implicit prices ̂β j (τg) estimated with a quantile
regression with all observations from data set j . In particular, we regress the price on
third degree polynomials of the continuous core characteristics, and on house type,
district, and yearly time dummies.14 Second, we use KS statistics and bootstrapped
p-values to test for dominance in the terms of Eq. (3).
Starting with Fa(p)− Fs(p), the results in the first row of Panel B of Table 3 show
that ask prices dominate sale prices as before at the usual significance levels. The
slightly different KS test statistics and p-values result from the price distributions now
being estimated with Eq. (4) instead of with the raw data. Turning to the role of charac-
teristics therein, we find that Fa|a(p)−Fa|s(p) ≤ 0 at all the usual significance levels.
That is, when evaluated at the same implicit prices, the characteristics in the ask data
strongly dominate those in the sale data. This was to be expected from the stochastic
dominance results for the continuous house characteristics of Panel A. We also find
13 Shimizu et al. (2016) plot point estimates for Eq. (3) and test whether differences between price and
valuation distributions of ask and sale data are zero (the latter test ignores that hedonic coefficients are
estimated). They do not test for stochastic dominance, although their Fig. 6 indicates that it might exist for
ask over sale prices.
14 The quantiles in Eq. (4) follow τg = c + (g − 1)(1 − 2c)/(G − 1). We set c = 0.01 and G = 200.
Trimming at c avoids estimation of tail quantiles (Koenker 2005, p. 148).
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that—once the characteristics are accounted for—the pricing of characteristics in the
ask data strongly dominates those in the sale data, i.e. Fa|s(p) − Fs|s(p) ≤ 0, at all
the usual significance levels. Hence, in all, prices in the ask data dominate those in the
sale data both with respect to characteristics and implicit prices.
To quantify the contribution of house characteristics and implicit prices to the ask
pricemarkups across the distribution (see Fig. 1), we use the quantile version of Eq. (3)
Qa(τ ) − Qs(τ ) =
{
Qa|a(τ ) − Qa|s(τ )
} + {Qa|s(τ ) − Qs|s(τ )
}
(5)
where Q j |k(τ ) is the τ th quantile of the distribution of the price in data set j , given
the characteristics in data set k. We obtain the quantiles by inverting the estimated
distribution functions F̂j |k(p). To conduct inference, we compute bootstrap pointwise
and uniform confidence bands. Results of the decompositions at the mean and for nine
quantiles are reported in Table 4.15
Estimates of E[pa] − E[ps] and Qa(τ ) − Qs(τ ), the left-hand sides of the mean
and quantile differences to be decomposed, are reported in Panel A of Table 4. The
estimated markup at the median is slightly lower than the markup reported in Fig. 1.
This is because the markups are estimated from Eq. (4), rather than the empirical
distribution functions (EDFs) of ask and sale prices. The upper-left (right) panel of
Fig. 4 shows a Q–Q plot for the ask (sale) price distribution estimated from Eq. (4)
and the EDF. For, both, ask and sale prices the distribution F̂j (p) resembles closely
the corresponding EDF. This is reflected in the estimated markups, which exhibit a
similar U-shaped pattern as the markups in Fig. 1.
Panels B and C of Table 4 show the estimated contributions of characteristics and
implicit prices to the corresponding differences of Panel A. As indicated by the Q-Q
plots in the lower panel of Fig. 4, the contribution of characteristics differences in
the two data sets accounts for the greater part of the markups. Nonetheless, according
to the pointwise and uniform confidence bands, implicit price contribute also to the
markups for τ > 0.3, at least, at the 0.05 level. At the means, pricing difference
contribute a tenth to the markup. This corresponds to 2.4 percentage points, which
is in the range of markups reported in papers that worked with matched ask and sale
data (see Fn. 3). At the medians, the contribution is of similar magnitude. At lower
quantiles, the contribution can be statistically zero, whereas it can be up to a fifth at
higher quantiles.
The analysis shows that implicit prices play a significant role for the ask price
markups. But the analysis also confirms that houses in the ask data are of better quality
than those in the sale data. We can only speculate about reasons for this selectivity. A
platform requires that households have access to the internet and use it for property
search. Somehouseholdsmight rely on traditional search channels, such as newspapers
or real estate agent registers. Selectivity could arise if the choice of channel is correlated
with the house characteristics that households are interested in. Analysis of data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for 2007–2015 shows that households in
15 At the means, we use the Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition. We estimate the implicit prices by running a
linear regression of the price on the continuous core variables and dummies for the house type, district, and
year. We include the continuous variables as third-degree polynomials, which is analogous to the quantile
regressions used to estimate Eq. (4).
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Table 4 Decomposition of markups. Shows decomposition of the ask and sale price distributions. Standard
errors for the mean (quantile) decomposition are computed using the Huber-White covariance estima-
tor (bootstrapped interquartile range of F̂ j |k (p)). Pointwise confidence intervals use critical values from
N (0, 1). Uniform confidence bands use empirical quantile of bootstrapped KS maximal t-statistic, see
Chernozhukov et al. (2013, p. 2222). The number of bootstrap replications is 200. Confidence level is set
to 0.95
Estimated Standard Pointwise Uniform
Effect Error Conf. Interv. Conf. Bands
Panel A. Markup
Mean Quantile 0.234 0.004 0.225 0.242
0.1 0.241 0.006 0.230 0.253 0.223 0.260
0.2 0.210 0.005 0.201 0.219 0.196 0.224
0.3 0.197 0.004 0.189 0.205 0.184 0.210
0.4 0.193 0.004 0.185 0.201 0.180 0.205
0.5 0.194 0.004 0.186 0.203 0.181 0.207
0.6 0.202 0.005 0.193 0.211 0.188 0.216
0.7 0.218 0.005 0.208 0.228 0.202 0.234
0.8 0.241 0.006 0.229 0.252 0.222 0.259
0.9 0.285 0.008 0.270 0.300 0.261 0.309
Panel B. Characteristics
Mean Quantile 0.210 0.005 0.201 0.219
0.1 0.246 0.005 0.236 0.256 0.234 0.258
0.2 0.212 0.004 0.204 0.221 0.201 0.223
0.3 0.192 0.004 0.184 0.201 0.182 0.203
0.4 0.181 0.004 0.173 0.189 0.171 0.191
0.5 0.177 0.004 0.169 0.185 0.166 0.187
0.6 0.177 0.004 0.169 0.185 0.166 0.188
0.7 0.185 0.004 0.176 0.193 0.173 0.196
0.8 0.199 0.005 0.190 0.209 0.187 0.211
0.9 0.237 0.006 0.225 0.250 0.221 0.253
Panel C. Implicit prices
Mean Quantile 0.024 0.004 0.017 0.032
0.1 −0.005 0.006 −0.017 0.007 −0.025 0.015
0.2 −0.003 0.004 −0.011 0.005 −0.016 0.011
0.3 0.004 0.003 −0.002 0.011 −0.007 0.016
0.4 0.011 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.001 0.022
0.5 0.018 0.003 0.012 0.023 0.008 0.027
0.6 0.025 0.003 0.019 0.031 0.015 0.035
0.7 0.033 0.003 0.027 0.040 0.023 0.044
0.8 0.041 0.004 0.034 0.049 0.029 0.054
0.9 0.048 0.005 0.039 0.057 0.032 0.064
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Fig. 4 Q–Q plots for price distributions. Upper-left (right) panel compares F̂a|a (F̂s|s ) to the EDF of the
ask (sale) price, where F̂ j |k is estimated from Eq. (4). Lower-left (right) panel compares F̂a|a (F̂a|s ) to
F̂a|s (F̂s|s ). Solid black line is the 45 degree line
Berlin who use the internet spend on average more on housing, even after controlling
for age, education income, and household size.16 It is therefore likely that platforms
attract users that are prepared to pay for better houses. On the customer side, the
majority (82.9%) of listings in the ask data are for existing houses. The rest are for
houses that are either new or at most one year old; about three quarters of these
houses are marketed directly by the developer. Existing houses are predominantly
(87.9%) marketed by real estate agents. As agents will receive a closing fee in case
of a successful match, they have an interest to chose the right marketing channel for
a particular property. Compared to the few existing houses that are marketed without
16 Per year, the GSOEP covers about six hundred households fromBerlin.We run a (unreported) regression
of housing consumption on a binary indicator for internet access—as a proxy for use—and controls for
the household head’s age and education, household income and size, and year effects. The coefficient on
internet access is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
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fee, indicating that no agent is involved, agents list houses that are on average larger,
although also slightly older. As platforms are characterised by indirect network effects,
these will enforce selectivity of the listed properties even more.17
In summary, the distribution of characteristics and the pricing of these characteris-
tics are significantly different in the ask and the sale data. This makes it possible that
research results are severely biased when ask data are used as a substitute for sale data.
3 Hedonic regression applications
We examine the extent of the bias that is introduced when sale data are substituted with
ask data for the three economic research areas: (1) estimating thewillingness to pay for
non-traded amenities, (2) automated valuation applications, (3) construction of price
indexes. For each of the three applications, we compare the results we obtain from ask
data with those we obtain from sale data. We explain the empirical methodology first,
followed by the presentation of the empirical results.
3.1 Methodology and implementation
3.1.1 The semiparametric hedonic model
Hedonic regression is the basis for each of the three economic applications. Fully para-
metric linear models can impose restrictions that do not accommodate the unknown
data generating process. Such models impose also restrictive assumptions on prefer-
ences (Ekeland et al. 2004). Nonparametric models provide full flexibility, but can
suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Semiparametric models place some structure
on the functional form and are a good compromise, see, for example, Bontemps et al.
(2008).18 Our semiparametric additive regression model is
p = zγ + f1(AGE) + f2(FA) + f3(PA) + f4(L AT , LON ) + ε (6)
For a given data set and observation, p is the price reported, the row vector z contains
dummy variables for the constant, quarters, discrete house characteristics, and—
depending on the specification—for the districts. The column vector γ contains the
coefficients for these discrete characteristics. The impact of the continuous character-
istics on the price are considered by smooth, but unspecified, functions f j . The error
term ε represents the part of the price left unexplained by the model. The continuous
characteristics are building age (AGE), floor (FA) and plot (PA) area, longitude and
17 This helps to understand the selectivity of the IS24 data, but does not explain why this platform attracts
listings of houses of better quality. A conversation with a representative of an agent trade body pointed to
the role of different pricing strategies of competing platforms. This is an area for further research.
18 Haupt et al. (2010) find that a log-log specification performs better out-of-sample than semi- and non-
parametric specifications (Anglin and Gencay 1996; Parmeter et al. 2007). The house transactions used in
these studies contain only one continuous characteristic. As we work with up to six continuous character-
istics, we expect that parametric restrictions will have a detrimental effect on performance. Our robustness
analysis points in this direction.
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latitude coordinates (L AT , LON ). We add f5(NOI ) to Eq. (6) once we examine the
WTP for the local noise level (NOI ).19
We model the nonparametric functions in Eq. (6) with penalised regression splines




b jk(x)β jk = b j (x)β j (7)
where b j (x) is the row vector of K j basis functions evaluated at x andβ j is the column
vector of coefficients (Wood 2017). The vector of coefficients determines the shape of
f j and has to be estimated.We use cubic splines as basis for the univariate functions in
Eq. (6) and a thin plate spline for the function of the geo-coordinates (in which case x
is a vector). Given the basis dimensions K j , the vector of all basis functions b(x) with
x the vector of continuous characteristics of an observation, the stacked coefficient



























dx and becomes large if f j is very wiggly
and small if the function is fairly straight.20 The smoothing parameter λ j determines
the degree at which wiggliness of the estimate of f j is penalised. To prevent excess
smoothing, we select the parameters with a double cross-validation criterion (DCV)
(Wood 2017, pp. 260). The web-appendix (B) provides details on the estimation pro-
cedure.
3.1.2 Willingness to pay
Once the hedonic regression is estimated, we compute for each characteristic the
average marginal willingness to pay (WTP) in monetary terms and compare by how
much the estimates differ between the two data sets. For a continuous characteristic,
we use












19 The regressionmodel of Eq. (6) has been referred to as a local regressionmodel in the real estate literature
(Clapp 2003, 2004) or a geoadditive model in the geostatistical literature (Kammann and Wand 2003). We
refer to it as a semiparametric additive model, the name commonly used in the statistics literature. Other
modelling approaches to control for spatial effects include geographically (or locally) weighted regression
and spatial error or spatial lag models. See, for example, Sunding and Swoboda (2010) and Small and
Steinmetz (2012) for applications to hedonic pricing andHill and Scholz (2018) for price index construction.
20 Depending on the specification, J is either 4 or 5. The elements of D j are discussed in Wood (2017,
Sec. 5.3 and 5.5).
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where we compute the derivative numerically with finite differences and p̂(·) is the
prediction from Eq. (6). For a discrete characteristic, we use









} − 1) exp
{
p̂(z0n, j , xn)
}
(10)
where z0n, j is the discrete characteristic vector for observation n with the entry for
j set to zero.21 To compute heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for the WTP
estimates, we use the pairs bootstrap (Freedman 1981).
3.1.3 Automated valuation
Weuse a rollingwindowdesign to split the data into estimation and validation samples.
The first validation sample contains all sale observations from 2009Q1. To predict
prices with the ask data, we use the observations from 2007Q2 to 2009Q1, estimate
the pricing function p̂a(·) from Eq. (6), and assess this function at the characteristics
(z, x) of the observations in the first validation sample. The choice of estimation
sample considers that ask data are available instantly. For the sale data, we proceed
similarly, but use observations from 2007Q1 to 2008Q4 to estimate p̂s(·). The lag
of one quarter considers that sale data are not instantly available. The validation and
estimation windows are then rolled out quarterly and predictions are computed until
the last validation sample in 2015Q4 is reached. The price predictions for the final
sample are computed for the ask (sale) data set based on the estimated price function
2014Q1 to 2015Q4 (2013Q4 to 2015Q3). We compute the prediction errors e j,n ≡
ps,n − p̂ j (zn, xn) from ask ( j = a) and sale ( j = s) data for further analysis.22
3.1.4 Price index construction and nowcasts
Wecompute constant-quality price indices from the ask and sale data using the hedonic
imputation method.23 We therefore use a rolling window design similar to the one
in Sect. 3.1.3. The first estimation sample contains all ask (sale) observations from
2007Q1 to 2008Q4. Given the estimated price function p̂ j (·) from Eq. (6), we impute
the price of a house with reference characteristics (z0, x0) for each quarter in the
estimation sample. The estimation sample is then rolled forward one quarter and the
fitted price function is used to impute the value of the reference house in 2009Q1. The
rolling imputations are continued until the last quarter 2015Q4 is reached. The ask
(sale) price index is then computed for a house with fixed characteristics and covers
the period 2007Q1 to 2015Q4.
21 Note that each of the individual willingness to pay terms over which we sum on the right-hand sides
of Eqs. (9) and (10) depends on all characteristics, including a property’s location. This implies that these
terms will vary spatially if location matters.
22 Due to the estimation lag, p̂s (·) ignores the time dummy for the current quarter in z.
23 See Hill (2013) for a recent survey on hedonic price indices and the web-appendix (C).
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As the sale price index become available only with the delay, whereas the ask price
index becomes available in real time, we examine the potential for nowcasting with
the regression
ΔI st = φ0 + φ1ΔI at + φ2ΔI at−1 + φ3ΔI st−1 + εt (11)
where I at (I
s
t ) is the ask (sale) price index for period t and the operator Δ produces
either the quarter-on-quarter or the year-on-year growth rate. We estimate Eq. (11)
with OLS and use robust standard errors to control for further structure in the short
series. Inclusion of ΔI st−1 allows to examine whether the ask price index can improve
upon an univariate forecast of the sale price index. As the index series have only 36
observations each, the examination will be limited.
3.2 Empirical results
3.2.1 Willingness to pay
We examine whether WTP estimates from the ask and the sale data differ statistically
and economically. It is known that estimates from hedonic regressions can suffer from
omitted variable bias, but Kuminoff et al. (2010) have shown in a simulation study
that spatial modelling can reduce such bias.24 We consider two spatial models in our
regressions. First, as observations in the ask data may provide only coarse location
information, we run regressions that model the spatial structure with district dummies
as spatial fixed effects. Second, we run regressions that model location finely with the
geospatial function f4(L AT , LON ).25 As some observations report no coordinates,
these regressions are fitted with smaller samples.26
Figure 5 shows the estimates of the functions f j in Eq. (6) for the three continuous
house characteristics age, floor and plot area. The upper (lower) panel shows the
estimates that result when location is modelled with spatial fixed effects (geospatial
function).
Evidently, as the ask data have more observations, the functions are estimated more
precisely. It also seems that all functions become smoother once the geospatial function
is used. The functions for the areas, while not identical, seem similarwhether estimated
with ask or sale data. However, we expect these functions to increase monotonically,
but the function for plot area estimated with ask data shows several ups and downs that
counter intuition. The functions for age differ substantially. When estimated with sale
data, the function falls monotonically up to an age of 60 years, where it increases and
falls again. This non-monotonic shift can be explained by a premium for houses that
survivedWWII.When estimated with ask data, the function increases over the first ten
years, which is counterintuitive, and exhibits for higher ages several ups and downs.
24 While omitted variable bias might pose problems for ask and sale data, it is not the source of the
comparative differences in the application results.
25 Hill and Scholz (2018) find that finely graded postcode spatial fixed effects can work as well as a
nonparametric function of coordinates, at least in a price index application.
26 13% (2%) of the ask (sale) observations have no coordinates, see bottom row of Table 5.
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Fig. 5 Estimates of components of semiparametric regression model. Upper panel shows estimates of
f1(AGE), f2(FA), and f3(PA) for regression in Eq. (6) that uses spatial fixed effects. Lower panel shows
estimates for the same functions, but controls with the geospatial function f4(L AT , LON ). The corre-
sponding estimated functions are shown in Fig. 6. Noise variable NOI is not included in the regressions.
Functions are normalised to have a mean of zero. Shaded areas are pointwise confidence intervals at the
0.95 level, computed using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
This erratic behaviour is hard to explain other than being an artefact of the ask data.
Figure 6 shows contour plots of the estimated geospatial functions. Both look similar
and pick up the high quality of amenities in the south-westerly neighbourhoods of
Berlin. Assessed at the locations of the sold houses, the correlation between the two
estimated functions is high (ρ = 0.94).
Table 5 presents in columns (1)–(4) the estimated WTPs for the core house char-
acteristics. We note that the standard errors for the WTPs are smaller when the ask
data are used (result of the larger sample sizes). In case of the ask data, only the use of
the geospatial function leads to an intuitive negative WTP for age, although it remains
insignificant at the usual levels (2). The counterintuitive age function from Fig. 5
shows up here. When estimated with the sale data, the estimated WTP for age is both
times negative at the usual significance levels, irrespective of the spatial modelling
approach. Regarding the house types, terraced is the reference type and the WTPs for
the other two types aligns with intuition only when the geospatial function is included
in the regressions. As to be expected from Kuminoff et al. (2010), it seems that the
geospatial function deals with omitted variable bias, as it leads to more intuitive WTP
estimates.
In the examination so far, we have used only those house characteristics that are in
the ask as well as in the sale data. The sale data are, however, of better quality and con-
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Fig. 6 Location value surface. Shows contour plot of estimated geospatial functions ̂f4(L AT , LON ) from
ask (left panel) and sale data (right panel). Location value surface is evaluated atmedian values of continuous
house characteristics and modal values of discrete house characteristics
tains also information on other characteristics and on parties involved in a transaction,
see the second part of Panel A in Table 2. (5) in Table 5 gives theWTP estimates when
we no longer ignore this information. The WTP estimates for the formerly omitted
variables seem sensible. The regression continues to use the geospatial function to
control for other omitted variables. (5) is our most complete specification and we use
its estimates as benchmark. Comparison of (4) with the benchmark shows that the
formally omitted characteristics from the sale data have only a fairly small effect on
the estimated WTPs for the core characteristics. The point estimates deviate by no
more than 10% from the benchmark. Things look different when we compare (2) with
the benchmark. In all but one case, the estimates from the ask data are between 1.4 and
2.7 times the benchmark. InflatedWTP estimates can be expected given the ask data’s
dominant characteristics and implicit price distributions. The only exception is the
WTP for age, which is only 0.1 times the benchmark. This reflects the counterintuitive
age function that results for the ask data.
Finally, we examine what such deviations imply for benefit assessment. Figure 7
plots nightly noise levels in Berlin for 2012, the darker the shading, the higher the
noise. For example, the dark strip from left to right in the upper part corresponds to
the noise emitted by Otto Lilienthal airport in Tegel; the noise emitted by inner-city
motorways is also visible.
Estimated with sale data, the function f5(NOI ) in Fig. 7 stays reasonably flat
at zero up to a level of 50db—the level of noise in a quiet suburban neighbour-
hood—and becomes increasingly negative at higher noise levels. Estimated with ask
data, however, the function puts a doubtful premium on silence—30db corresponds
to rustling leaves—and exhibits non-monotonic behaviour. The estimated WTPs that
result from these two functions are reported in Table 6.
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Fig. 7 Noise levels and WTP. Left panel shows noise levels in decibel (dB(A)) in Berlin at night for 2012.
The data comes from Berlin’s Senate Department for Urban Development and Housing. Right panel shows
estimates of the function f5 from specifications (2) and (5) in Table 5, when including f5. Shaded areas are
0.95 pointwise confidence intervals, computed using heteroscedasticity robust standard errors
Table 6 Willingness to pay for noise levels. ReportsWTP estimates and regression diagnostics for penalised
least squares estimates of Eq. (6).WTPs are computedwith Eq. (9). Specification for ask (sale) data identical
to (2) ((5)) from Table 5 plus noise function f5(NOI ). Standard errors are computed using the pairs
bootstrap. Number of bootstrap replications is 200. R̄2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. DCV
is the double cross-validation score. Significant at ∗∗∗0.001 level, ∗∗0.01 level, ∗0.05 level
Ask data Sale data
WTP SE WTP SE




The estimates are negative—noise is a disamenity—and significantly different
(Welch’s t-test has a p-value of 0.000).27 The difference between the point estimates
seems economically small, which ignores that noise usually affects many households.
The difference becomes EUR532,900 per km2 after we factor in that in Berlin the
average density is 1700 households per km2. Obviously, a policy maker who uses the
cost-benefit criterion to decide on a night flight ban may come to the wrong decision
when the benefit is estimated with ask data.
3.2.2 Automated valuation
Table 7 presents performance measures for the out-of-sample predictions for regres-
sions fitted separately to ask and sale data.
27 The point estimates correspond to a reduction of the average ask (sale) price by 0.4% (0.3%). Winke
(2017, p. 1284) finds a reduction of 1.7% and reports that previous studies found reductions between 0.1%
to 3.6%.
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Table 7 Assessment of prediction errors. Shows performance statistics for 9,152 out-of-sample prediction
errors.±10% (±25%) reports the proportion of errors which are in absolute terms no larger than 10% (25%)
Data MSE Bias Var. Med. MAE ±10% ±25%
Ask 0.077 −0.035 0.076 −0.021 0.214 0.304 0.670
Sale 0.051 0.007 0.051 0.017 0.174 0.368 0.752
The prediction errors ea,n do not perform as well as the errors es,n . The threshold
proportions are less than 0.9 times of those for the latter and the MSE is 1.5 times as
large. The negative bias of the errors ea,n is not surprising given that the distribution
of implicit prices in the ask dominates those in the sale data.28 However, the errors
es,n show also bias, which reflects the quarterly lag of the data used for estimation.
The magnitude of the bias is half of the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of quality-
controlled sale prices, see Fig. 8. One could suspect that the differential performance
of the errors comes mainly from the tendency of ask prices to be larger than sale
prices. However, the bias is fairly unimportant for the MSE of the two sets of errors.
The inferior performance of the ea,n errors comes mainly from their high variance,
the result of fewer variables that can be used and their tilted pricing differences.
3.2.3 Price indices and nowcasts
Figure 8 shows the quality-controlled ask and sale price indices, based, respectively, on
specifications (2) and (5) from Table 5. The two indices have overall the same upward
trend, but the trend masks some differences that are visible in the quarter-on-quarter
growth rates. As both indices control for observed characteristics, these differences are
due to differential valuations, wider coverage of characteristics and a random element.
Table 8 assesses the strength of the relation between the two indices and gives
results for the price index growth rate regression from Eq. (11). Panel A (B) reports
results for quarter-on-quarter (year-on-year) growth rates. As (1) shows, the con-
temporaneous rates of the two indices are positively correlated, but the relation is
stronger for the year-on-year than the quarter-on-quarter growth rates (ρ̂ = 0.80 ver-
sus ρ̂ = 0.51). The former are usually less volatile, which makes it more likely to
detect a relationship—if it exists—in small samples like ours. Interestingly, the coef-
ficient on ΔI at is significantly less than one, across (1)–(5) in, both, Panel A and B.
This shows that the ask price index is not a perfect substitute for the sale price index.29
For the quarter-on-quarter growth rates, adding the lagged growth rates of the ask or
sale price does not improve explanatory power, see R̄2 in (2)–(4). In (5), however,
the coefficients on ΔI at−1 and ΔI st−1 are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and
28 p̂a(z, x) are effectively imputed ask prices and the bias of 3.5% falls well within the range of markups
observed in studies that use matched data, see Fn. 3.
29 In (1), a test of the joint hypothesis H0 : φ0 = 0 and φ1 = 1 is rejected at the 0.001 (0.01) level for
quarter-on-quarter (year-on-year) growth rates. Backward-looking ask prices, as evidenced in Genesove and
Mayer (2001), may contribute to the less than perfect relationship between the contemporaneous growth
rates.
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Fig. 8 Quarterly quality-adjusted house price indices. Upper panel shows ask and sale price indices for
Berlin 2007Q1–2015Q4, lower panel shows quarter-on-quarter growth rates. The growth rate of the ask
(sale) price index is 1.5% (1.4%) with volatility of 3.2% (2.8%)
Δ Î st = 0.006+ 0.569ΔI at + 0.324ΔI at−1 − 0.314ΔI st−1 produces the best in-sample
fit. For the year-on-year growth rates, the lag of the sale price has on its own already
high predictive power, see (3). But even in this instance, the inclusion of the current
growth rate of the ask price index improves explanatory power, see R̄2 in (4) and (5).
For a nowcast, it is best to use Δ Î st = 0.014 + 0.531ΔI at + 0.268ΔI st−1.
Taken together, the examination provides evidence that an ask price index is not
a substitute for a sale price index but can lead to better nowcast. Longer time series
are needed to obtain clearer in-sample results and to extend the examination to out-
of-sample nowcasts.
3.2.4 Robustness checks
We conducted several robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results to
methodological choices, see the web-appendix (D) for details. First, we examined the
sensitivity of the markup decomposition to a different specification of the quantile
regressions. A linear model does not alter the results much and gives an even stronger
role to the implicit prices for the markups. This implies that our reported results
from the polynomial model are conservative. Second, we estimated the WTP for non-
overlapping sub-periods of our sample. We found little difference between the WTP
computed with individual WTP estimates for sub-samples and estimates for the full
sample. The former estimates have higher standard errors, however, whichmakes them
inferior to the ones reported here. We also found statistical evidence that the mark-ups
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ofWTPestimates fromask data over estimates fromsale data remains the sameover the
sub-samples. Third, instead of using a constant factor to convert the floor area from the
interior area, we used an estimated conversion function that considers building age and
type. We estimated this function with transaction data that have information on both
area characteristics. The floor areas imputed with the estimated function are highly
correlated with those that use the constant conversion factor. Fourth, the estimates
in Fig. 5 might suggest that commonly applied parametric specifications, such as
polynomials, could be appropriate. However, we found that such a specification leads
inferior predictive performance compared to the semiparametric model we use here.
4 Conclusion
Unlike transaction data, listings data are readily available from platforms. This makes
it an appealing new source of data for housing market research. Researchers have
already begun to use ask data in the three established applications of WTP estimation,
automated valuation, and price index construction. This paper examined whether it is
valid to do so.
The literature on search and bargaining in housing markets suggests that ask data
will differ in important aspects from sale data. Our empirical investigation produced
three important insights into this difference. First, distributions of ask and sale prices
differ, mainly because the composition of characteristics differs between the data sets.
But the estimates of implicit prices also differ between the two data sets. This indicates
that ask data might not be a valid substitute for sale data in the three applications.
Indeed, WTP estimates for house characteristics and local noise levels from the two
data sets can be considerably different. Second, ask data are not very useful to predict
market values of individual houses, as the predictions suffer from upward bias and
large error variance. Third, we find that an ask price index is not a substitute for a sale
price index. It is, however, a complement to the latter, as we obtain evidence that it
is useful for nowcasting. No doubt, listings data can be useful for research, but ask
data are no replacement for sale data, at least in the three applications that we have
considered in this paper.
There are potential avenues for future research. We used ask data from only one
platform, albeit the largest. Analysis of data from other platforms could provide further
insights into the selection bias of characteristics that we observed. It would not deal
with the problem that some sellers simply do not advertise on platforms. Recent
events might change this in the near future. In 2015, the German regulator permitted
the merger between the second and the third largest platform (see Fn. 5), which should
increase competition for such sellers. With the onset of the Coronavirus pandemic in
March 2020, several platforms allowed private customers to list at no charge. While
not permanent, this measure could bring new customers who stay even once they are
charged. This could make ask data more representative. However, the selection bias is
not responsible for the result that the estimated implicit prices differ between the two
data sets. Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Bigelow et al. (2020) provide explanations
for this result. Sellers (and agents) canmisperceive the value to others of characteristics
that are salient to them (the price they paid, the importance of amenities). They will
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learn the value to others during the bargaining process. The element of bargaining is—
yet—missing from platforms. Still, as platforms provide a wide range of visual and
textual information of comparable houses on the market, sellers (and agents) might
become able to distinguish better how the average seller values characteristics that
they hold dear. In this case, we expect that the difference in implicit prices should
shrink if platforms make the market more transparent.
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